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The rented sector of the housing market is a key concern for policies trying to improve 
dwelling-level energy efficiency levels. Currently, stepping up energy efficiency levels in the 
residential sector is hindered by a number of uncertainties. For rental properties, this is 
complicated by the split incentive problem (i.e. landlords do not benefit directly from the 
savings arising from these investments). Instead, the benefits are enjoyed by the tenants of these 
upgraded properties via lower energy bills and/or enhanced thermal comfort. Hence, the only 
way to recoup the investments is typically for landlords to obtain higher rents. This study 
confirms that energy efficiency features, as measured by the Energy Performance Certificate 
rating, are positively associated with a small but significant influence on transaction prices 
and quoted rental prices. Conversely, there appears to be a price discount for dwellings in the 
lowest energy performance category. A model of time-on-market yields inconclusive results 
but there is some, albeit weak, evidence of a negative relationship between time-on-market and 
energy efficiency ratings as more energy efficient dwellings tend to lease up more quickly. 
Keywords: Energy efficiency; Green property; Hedonic model; Private rental market; Split 
incentives; Sustainability 
1. Introduction 
The present study focusses on a crucial sector of the housing market, the Private Rented Sector 
(PRS), which has experienced high growth rates in recent years and now provides housing to 
some five million households in the UK (Paragon, 2015). Apart from its size and importance, 
the PRS also presents an economic dilemma not typically observed in the owner-occupied 
segment. This dilemma which is effectively a barrier to achieving higher energy efficiency is 
known as the split incentive problem and arises because capital investments in energy 
efficiency are made by one party, the landlord, but the benefits are reaped by another, the 




economic channel for recouping the initial capital outlay is the landlord’s ability to charge a 
higher rent. Whether higher rents are indeed achievable for properties with higher energy 
efficiency is therefore a crucial question which landlords and property investors need to 
consider before committing to an investment (Adan and Fuerst, 2015). 
Closely related to the question of an energy efficiency rent premium is the question of 
transaction prices. Price signals are a key feature of markets. When information about 
important characteristics of a good is unavailable or expensive to obtain, price signals may be 
used to indicate quality and attractiveness. Real estate buyers need to determine and screen out 
low-quality assets from high-quality ones despite not being able to directly and fully observe 
the quality characteristics. With regard to the energy efficiency performance of a building, 
potential sellers are often unable to directly verify intrinsic green attributes of a property and 
must rely on incoming information from the marketplace in the form of eco-labels. 
To improve the information available to those in the PRS in EU countries, an Energy 
Performance Certificate (EPC) must be provided by the landlord to the tenant before a property 
can be let out or sold. Overall, the current situation is marked by uncertainties that impede 
further progress towards greening of the UK housing stock. For landlords, uncertainty persists 
over key parameters, such as the payback period and market acceptance of rent increases. For 
tenants, energy efficiency ratings and/or even energy bills from previous tenants may only have 
limited predictive power for their own energy consumption. 
The present study first examines a sample of PRS properties in England with a hedonic 
regression model, dividing a property’s price into different components related to its 
corresponding characteristics, in order to establish if home energy efficiency can lead to 
increased property sales prices. The results indicate that high EPC ratings in dwellings are 




In the second part of this paper, rental rates and time-on-market are analysed using the same 
analytical framework. A rental premium is found for energy efficient properties, even when 
controlling for a number of rental determinants. These findings suggest that capitalisation of 
green features into rental and sale prices are likely to accelerate the adoption of energy efficient 
buildings. 
The contribution of the present paper is twofold. It differs from previous studies by being, to 
the best knowledge of the authors, the first study to present a rigorous economic analysis of the 
value of energy efficiency in the English private rented sector by combining a rich database 
previously inaccessible to researchers evidence with public data on amenities and socio-
economic population characteristics. The second contribution is more general in that it seeks 
to explore if a largely unregulated rental market such as the UK yields price and rent 
capitalisation from EPCs that are comparable to the more regulated markets in mainland 
Europe. It is not straightforward to formulate an expectation prior to empirical testing. On the 
one hand, more regulated markets tend to provide more clarity to landlords and tenants on 
legally allowable rent increases following a green retrofit which may help gains in energy 
efficiency to manifest themselves in rents and prices more easily. On the other hand, where 
these more regulated markets also grant considerable subsidies and tax deducations for making 
homes more energy efficient, landlords may not seek to recoup their expenses via the rent 
channel to the same extent as their peers in non-regulated markets. Hence, the level of 
capitalisation would be expected to be lower in a relatively unregulated market. Following this 
introduction, the paper is divided into five sections. Section two discusses relevant previous 
studies. Section three details the hedonic pricing model. Section four explores the datasets and 
descriptive statistics. Section five provides a discussion on the regression outputs. Section six 
concludes and suggests extensions for future research. 




Studies of barriers to achieving  greater energy efficiency in the existing building stock 
typically focus on either technical or non-technical barriers (Femenías et al., 2018).  A 
comprehensive discussion of technical barriers can be found in O'Malley and Sorrell (2003). 
Non-technical obstacles can be divided into four categories: limitations on decision-making, 
rational behaviour, organisational failures, and market failures - e.g. imperfect information and 
split incentives (Sorrell, 2003). 
The present study is closely related to the non-technical obstacles branch of literature, by 
empirically exploring market failures in the PRS in England through property prices. An 
important problem explored in this paper is related to split incentives as a consequence of the 
information asymmetry problem. Information asymmetries between homeowners and tenants 
negatively impact the adoption of building energy efficiency measures, consisting of an 
effective barrier to increase green property investments (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Femenías et 
al., 2018). 
Very few studies have attempted to quantify the price effect of energy efficiency levels in the 
residential market, let alone the PRS. Below is a short review of the main existing empirical 
evidence. 
2.1. Energy efficiency and sales prices 
Despite the fact that there is a wide variability on the scale of price effects on energy efficiency, 
the empirical results provided by the present paper are broadly consistent with most of the 
studies in the literature, in which positive relationships between property prices and energy 
efficiency are reported. However, few studies find divergent results, concluding that either 
energy performance is not necessarily rewarded (Cerin et al., 2014) or even energy efficiency 




Berry et al. (2008) conducted one of the first studies on the effect of mandatory green 
certification on residential house prices. The study reports a significant relationship between 
the energy efficiency rating of a dwelling and its sale price in Australia between 2005 and 2006, 
with premiums of 1.23% found in 2005 and 1.91% in 2006, in response to a 0.5 score increase 
on the 0-10 energy rating scale. 
In the European Union, Brounen and Kok (2011) examined the impact of energy labels on 
house prices in the Netherlands. Residential properties with an above-average green label rated 
A, B and C command premiums of 10%, 5.5% and 2.2% respectively. In a parallel study in 
Ireland, Hyland et al. (2013) show that there is an 9.3% price premium for A-rated dwellings, 
5.5% premium for B ratings, and a significant -10.6% discount for F and G ratings. A small 
but positive relationship between energy performance and sale prices is also found for the 
housing market in Northern Ireland (Davis et al., 2015). 
Studies conducted in the UK draw a similar conclusion. Fuerst et al. (2015), using 325,950 
dwellings sold at least twice from 1995 to 2011, report significant positive premiums for 
dwellings rated A/B (5%) or C (1.8%). For dwellings rated E (-0.7%) and F (-0.9%), significant 
discounts are found. Recent studies in Nordic countries - Denmark (Jensen et al., 2016) and 
Finland (Fuerst et al., 2016), confirm a significant role of energy efficiency ratings for sale 
prices. 
The consensus of a green premium in the housing market is not unanimous among all studies. 
An important theoretical economic argument underpinning the lack of a premium would be 
that landlords are already charging the maximum obtainable rent. This argument has its 
antecedents in Ricaridian rent theory and has been reformulated by Samuelson (1959). When 




landlords would charge the maximum rent they can obtain from tenants based on the latter’s 
wages, which reflect the marginal product of their labour. Therefore, any improvements in 
energy efficiency may remain unrewarded if tenants already pay the maximum share of their 
incomes. For example, the two empirical studies below find a negligible impact on prices. 
Using Swedish housing transactions between 2009 and 2010, Cerin et al. (2014) show that 
energy performance is not rewarded across all property-price classes and ages of residential 
properties and conclude that there is little evidence of price penalties for the least energy 
efficient properties, although, within the most energy efficient houses, a significant association 
between energy performance and house prices is reported. Similarly, Yoshida and Sugiura 
(2010) show a significant price discount of 5.5% and a lower depreciation rate for newly 
constructed green condominiums in Tokyo. Interestingly, this suggests that properties with 
high energy efficiency ratings are likely to command lower market prices. 
Appendix A provides an overview of empirical studies examining the impact of energy 
efficiency on house prices, in which there is a slight trend towards smaller green premiums in 
recent studies. 
2.2. Energy efficiency and rents 
Empirical studies examining the capitalisation of energy efficiency in the PRS are rare. The 
apparent gap in the literature is not surprising. Quality concerns and suitability of available 
data are often cited limitations and there is no clear consensus on the scale of the price effect 
of energy efficiency. Case studies from Sweden, Germany, and Ireland all report a positive 
relationship between energy efficiency and residential rents. 




Similarly, Hyland et al. (2013) report that A-rated properties have a green sale price premium 
of 11% and a green rent premium of 1.9% in the Irish residential market. Interestingly, not only 
does this study suggest a positive relationship between energy efficiency and rental and sale 
prices, but it also suggests that buyers exhibit a stronger willingness to pay more for energy 
efficiency than tenants. 
Cajias and Piazolo (2013) find a rent premium of 1.7% in the German market. In related 
research, Kholodilin et al. (2017) found that energy efficiency are generally capitalised into 
rental prices in Berlin. Earlier, Rehdanz (2007) arrived at similar conclusions exploring the 
German housing market. 
3. Research design 
The hedonic pricing model is the standard methodology for examining value determinants in 
housing. In the present study, this method is used to primarily isolate the effect of EPC rating 
on price, taking the following fully linear form (Rosen, 1974): 
𝑷𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑿𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
(1) 
where 𝑷𝑖𝑡 is the transaction price of property 𝑖, measured as the natural logarithm of the price 
in GBP per square metre (m2) at time 𝑡 , in which 𝑡 = 0 … 𝑇 , and 𝑿𝑖𝑘𝑡  is a vector of 𝐾 
explanatory locational and physical characteristics, including categorical variables related to 
energy labelling and property characteristics. Note that the present analysis uses the sale price 
per square metre rather than the total recorded price. This reduces the predictive power of the 
model but provides a more robust measure of prices as it eliminates the size effect contained 
in the recorded transaction price.  The term 𝛽0𝑡  refers to the intercept, 𝛽𝑘𝑡  is a vector of 
characteristics parameters to be estimated, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a random error term (white noise) with 




to each variable are equivalent to their overall contribution to price. The estimation of rents 
adopts the following functional form: 
log 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∑ 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡 
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ 𝛽2 ∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
+  𝛽3 ∑ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 
𝐾
𝑘=1






The dependent variable log 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the natural logarithm of the asking rent per m
2 in GBP, 
indexed by property 𝑖 and time 𝑡. The logarithmic-linear model specification is the preferred 
functional form due to the fact that it mitigates the effect of extreme values and it facilitates 
the interpretation of the coefficient as average percentage premiums/discounts. 
Previous emprical studies on rental determination provide no conclusive list of variables to be 
included in the model. In order to isolate the effect of the environmental certificate on rent, the 
focus is on housing units’ physical characteristics as well as neighbourhood characteristics. 
The term 𝛽𝑘𝑡 is a vector of parameters that captures the marginal effect each attribute (𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡) of 
the rental unit has on the rental rate: 
𝜕𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡  𝜕𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄  =  𝛽𝑘𝑡 
(3) 
∈𝑖𝑡  is a random composite error term, assumed to be independent across observations and 
normally distributed, with mean zero and constant variance 𝜎2. The independent variable of 
interest is the vector of energy effiency ratings, which controls for the property energy 
performance rating. Hedonic estimates can be biased due to the omitted-variable bias (OVB) 
problem. While every effort has been made to include all relevant value drivers in the current 





4. Data and descriptive statistics 
The hedonic analysis outlined above requires a large sample of property transaction prices and 
characteristics. For the purpose of the present study, data from several sources were merged.  
4.1. Dataset building 
In the first step, data on market prices were obtained from the UK’s Land Registry, comprising 
residential transaction prices from 1995 to 2013. In the second step, through address matching, 
this data was cross-referenced with the HomeCo Internet Property Ltd rental data to obtain 
information on property size, dwelling type, age, and energy performance. 
The sample was further enhanced by adding socio-economic data from the Office for National 
Statistics and indicators provided by the UK Census. Particularly the English Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (IMD), which contains an aggregation of the following seven neighbourhood 
profile domains: income; employment; education, skills and training; health and disability; 
crime; barriers to housing and services; and living environment. All reported to be important 
locational control variables in previous studies. Our model specifications included either the 
combined IMD score or its constituent elements but it was found that this choice does not 
significantly alter the results with regard to the variables of interest.  
To ensure a representative sample, observations across hundreds of different neighbourhoods 
in England were obtained via a stratified random draw. The sample covers approximately 4,600 
rental observations, which includes information on sale prices of virtually all of these 
properties. It is worth noting that the analysis was performed on a smaller number of 
observations (4,132 and 4,076 observations for sale prices and rental values respectively) due 
to missing values in their respective explanatory variables. 
Fig. 1 compares the sample distribution with the population distribution of all EPCs reported 
by the Department for Communities and Local Government and the English Housing Survey. 




Additionally, the hedonic regression model should control for smaller variations between the 
sample and the underlying population. 
 
Fig. 1. Distribution of EPC bands for study sample (red) and external reference, DCLG (blue). Data sources: 
Landmark and DCLG. 
 
A further concern is that important price determinants may be highly correlated with EPCs. 
Fig. 2 confirms that the distribution of EPC bands varies considerably depending on the year 
of construction. Hence, it was necessary to include age of construction (vintage bands) in our 
model to disentangle these two effects. However, there may be other confounding effects that 
remain uncontrolled for even when building age is included in the model. For example, it is to 
be suspected that F and G rated properties could generally be in worse condition and have 
lower aesthetic appeal, inflating the price discount to buildings with low EPC ratings. Since 
there is no information on the condition of a property in the present study, it cannot be ruled 
out that these price drivers enter the calculated EPC price effects. 
Similarly, it is possible that F and G rated properties are perceived to entail higher costs in the 




























but also in terms of general maintenance work. The equilibrium sales price would then adjust 
downwards to reflect the present value of these higher deferred costs. 
 
Fig. 2. Sample distribution by EPC band and vintage period. Data source: Landmark. 
Information on rents and dwelling characteristics was also obtained from HomeCo. Efforts 
were made to ensure that each dwelling included in the sample had both an on-market and an 
off-market date. According to the data providers, this increased the likelihood of the asking 
rents in the sample matching the transacted rents. 
This sample contains rental prices of 5,300 properties advertised for rent from 2011 to 2015, 
along with corresponding information on property location, type, size, number of bedrooms, 
and vintage class. Socio-economic information from the census and the IMD were added, along 
with information on energy performance ratings obtained from the EPC register. 
4.2. Regression diagnostic and robustness checks 
A series of diagnostic and robustness checks were undertaken. As some flats and terrace houses 
are held on a leasehold basis, tenure was added as an additional control variable in the 
regression. Moreover, only properties which changed hands more than once were included in 









































The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was also applied to test for multicollinearity. Overall, the 
estimation of the EPC price effects appears to be robust to these variations and tests, but it is 
important to bear in mind that the magnitude of these effects may still be distorted by correlated 
factors that were not included in the model. 
4.3. Key features of the dataset 
The descriptive statistics in Appendix B show interesting points. Average prices in the PRS in 
England seem to be lower than the overall housing market, which is consistent with evidence 
published by the Bank of England (Bracke et al., 2015). Also, in line with statistics from the 
English Housing Survey, the transacted buy-to-let properties are relatively smaller in size. 
Almost half of the properties were constructed before 1950, with less than 6% built in the last 
decade. Terraced properties and flats account for approximately 54% and 10% of the sample, 
respectively. Most properties are also held in freehold. In contrast to leasehold, freehold tenure 
refers to a case in which the ownership of a building or plot of land is outright for an unlimited 
period of time. Overall, the properties appear to be spread evenly across the different 
deprivation levels. 
Moreover, approximately two-thirds of the dwellings have EPCs rating below C, with none 
being rated A and only 2% being rated B. Similarly, only 1.5% are in the G category. As low 
numbers in these categories may produce unreliable results, a combined B/C category and a 
combined F/G category are formed. In line with previous studies, EPC ratings exhibit a strong 
correlation with building age. 
The average monthly rental rates in England exhibit marked persistent differences as shown in 
Fig. 3, with listed rental prices in the South being priced significantly higher in comparison 





Fig. 3. Average monthly rental prices. Each dot represents an LSOA in England with lighter colours indicating 
lower rents and vice-versa. 
In terms of marketing periods, Fig. 4 illustrates that, on average, they are higher in the North 
and relatively low in the Southeast and London. These differences in rental rates and marketing 
periods between the North and South of England is historically linked to differences in 
economic activity. These descriptive statistics are consistent with a priori expectations derived 





Fig. 4. Average time-on-market (difference between listing date and off-market date) at the LSOA level in 
England. Each dot represents an LSOA in England with lighter colours indicating shorter time on market and 
vice-versa. 
Appendices D and E provide descriptive statistics of the categorical variables. The sample 
largely consists of flats and terraced houses and over 60% of the properties contain two 
bedrooms. The majority of the properties in the sample (86%) are located in urban settlements. 
This is consistent with the spread of private rented properties in England. 
In terms of socio-economic area characteristics, properties are spread evenly across the 
different levels of deprivation. The geographic spread of the observations in the sample is also 
statistically desirable, in which approximately 21% of the properties are located in the 
Northwest, 20% in Yorkshire, 14% in West Midlands, and 8% in the Greater London. 
In line with the national average, 34% of the properties in the sample are in the D-rated 




rated properties (less than 1% of the sample). In this study, for practical reasons, the sole A-
rated property in the sample is excluded and F and G rated properties are clustered together. 
5. Results and discussion 
The estimation results for the hedonic regression on log sale prices are shown in Table 1. The 
model fit as indicated by the R-squared captures between 43% and 44% of the variation in sale 
prices. This is in line with expectations since price per square metre rather than total price paid 
is used as the dependent variable.  
Turning to the variable of interest, there is broadly a statistically significant relationship 
between the energy performance rating and the sale price of a dwelling. Relative to band D, 
which is the most frequently reported EPC band and is thus used as the baseline category, the 
pattern of price effects reveals a significant and positive effect of approximately 6% for B/C 
rated dwellings. For properties in the F/G category, depending on the specification, there is a 
statistically significant discount of 10-11% compared to D-rated properties. No significant 
relationship is found for E-rated properties. Model 2 is an alternative estimation using robust 
regression to account for influential observations that may exert leverage on sensitive 
coefficient estimates.  
When the price per square metre is regressed against energy efficiency score and a vector of 
control variables (Model 3), a one percent increase in the 0-100 energy efficiency score 
produces an approximately 0.12% increase in the predicted dwelling price. 
Table 1 
Energy rating and sale price: hedonic estimations. 
Dependent variable: log sale price per m2 









Log EPC   0.119*** 
EPC band = D vs.: Reference Reference  
EPC band B/C 0.061*** 0.063***  




EPC band F/G -0.101* -0.112**  
Number of bedrooms 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
Log floor area in m2 -0.587*** -0.573*** -0.573*** 
Tenure freehold = yes 0.194*** 0.187*** 0.191*** 
Rural area = yes 0.000 0.014 0.015 
Purchased brand new -0.033 -0.038 -0.037 
Log multiple IMD score Components 0.038*** 0.038*** 
Constant 8.964*** 9.615*** 9.141*** 
Vintage era fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Property type fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (model fit) 0.44 0.43 0.43 
Sample Size 4,132 4,132 4,132 
The asterisks show significance levels.  *p = 0.05, **p = 0.01 and ***p = 0.001. Robust standard errors are used. Complete results are 
shown in Appendix C. 
 
Next, rental rates are analysed to ascertain if the pricing relationships found in sales 
transactions also hold for the private rental market. The estimates in Table 2 provide a detailed 
description of rental prices as a function of their determinants. Each model explains a relatively 
large proportion of the variation in rent price. Depending on the specification, the number of 
bedrooms coefficient suggests that one additional bedroom increases the monthly rental price 
by approximately 10-11%. The negative but significant relationship between rental price and 
floor area reflects that the rental price per m2 for the larger properties is likely to be relatively 
slightly lower than that of much smaller properties. Furthermore, there is a significant rental 
price premium of 5-7% associated with rental units located in urban areas. 
Turning to the price effects of EPC ratings, B-rated units are found to command a green rent 
premium of approximately 4% compared to the reference EPC band D. In addition, rental units 
with EPC band C show a similar rent premium, between 3% and 5% of rent. Conversely, F/G-
rated units present a rent discount of approximately 5% in the robust estimation but this 
coefficient is not significant in the baseline OLS estimation. 




Given the large degree of heterogeneity in the rental stock, a closer investigation by property 
type seems warranted. Allen et al. (1995) argue that hedonic price functions may not be 
identical across property types since the structural parameters determining rent levels of flats 
(apartments) are likely to be different for other property types. Drawing on this insight, 
interaction terms involving property types and the natural logarithm of EPC rating were added 
to the regression in order to investigate this assumption. In Model 3, semi-detached, terraced 
house, and flats have a positive statistically significant relationship with log EPC in comparison 
with the reference category (i.e. detached vs. log EPC). 
Moreover, as detailed in Appendix F, neighbourhood factors our found to be relevant 
determinants of rent levels, consistent with previous studies (Kain and Quigley, 1970; 
DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1992; Potepan, 1996). 
Table 2 
Energy rating and rental price: hedonic estimations. 
Dependent variable: log of monthly rent per m2 












Log EPC   -0.159 
EPC band = D vs.: Reference Reference  
EPC band B     0.038*     0.026  
EPC band C 0.049*** 0.030***  
EPC band E     -0.001     0.001  
EPC band F/G     -0.035 -0.049**  
Interaction Terms (Property Type vs. Log EPC)    
Detached vs. Log EPC   Reference 
Semi-detached vs. Log EPC   0.237** 
Terraced House vs. Log EPC   0.239** 
Flat vs. Log EPC   0.247** 
Number of bedrooms 0.112*** 0.096*** 0.113*** 
Log floor area in m2 -0.705*** -0.745*** -0.703*** 
Tenure freehold = yes 0.023 0.016 0.014 
City or Urban area = yes 0.068*** 0.051*** 0.061*** 
Log multiple IMD score Components 0.022*** 0.021*** 




Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (model fit) 0.63 0.52 0.62 
Sample Size 4,076 4,076 4,076 
Asterisks indicate significance levels: *p = 0.05, **p = 0.01 and ***p = 0.001. Robust standard errors are used. Complete results are 
shown in the Appendix F. 
 
Finally, Table 3 reports the results for time-on-market, defined as the number of days between 
making a letting advert available on-line and removing it, against the full set of control 
variables. It is, however, apparent that the explanatory power of the models is generally low 
and that most of the coefficients are not statistically significant. This is not surprising as several 
important determinants of the time on market such as individual over or underpricing and the 
number of competing rental units listed for rent at any given time are not represented in the 
estimation equation. 
Table 3 
Energy rating and time-on-market: hedonic estimations. 
Dependent variable: log of time-on-market in days 











Log EPC  -0.129 -0.481 
EPC band = F/G vs.: Reference   
EPC band B -0.345*   
EPC band C -0.230   
EPC band D -0.065   
EPC band E -0.283*   
Interaction Terms (Property Type vs. Log EPC)    
Detached vs. Log EPC   Reference 
Semi-detached vs. Log EPC   0.308 
Terraced House vs. Log EPC   0.626 
Flat vs. Log EPC   0.366 
Log Monthly Rent -0.173* -0.035 -0.185* 
Number of bedrooms 0.050 0.026 0.052 
Log floor area in m2 0.073 0.055 0.076 
Tenure freehold = yes -0.033 0.013 -0.024 
City or Urban area = yes -0.105 -0.146** -0.103 
Log multiple IMD score 0.062* 0.003 0.061* 




Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (model fit) 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Sample Size 4,069 4,069 4,069 
Asterisks indicate significance levels: *p = 0.05, **p = 0.01 and ***p = 0.001. Robust standard errors are used. Complete results are 
shown in the Appendix G. 
 
Previous studies also report that, although the physical characteristics of a rental unit are 
important drivers, time-on-market also varies systematically with factors such as tenant 
mobility (Guasch and Marshall, 1985). This implies that additional determinants of the 
marketing period are unaccounted for in the estimation of the coefficients. Despite being 
inconclusive, two interesting observations emerge from these results. 
Firstly, the negative coefficient of rent level indicates that rental units with relatively higher 
listed rental prices are likely to stay listed for longer, with the caveat that the equilibrium rent 
level is assumed to be set exogenously, but landlords can deviate from this equilibrium by 
setting too high or too low asking rents, which would in turn affect time-on-market. Secondly, 
in Model 1, B and E-rated rental units are predicted to achieve a relevant statistically significant 
lower time-on-market in comparison to those in the lowest EPC category of F/G. The remaining 
coefficients of energy efficiency bands and the energy efficiency score are not statistically 
significant. 
5.1. Research findings connection with previous comparable studies 
The positive price premiums reported in the present study for dwellings with favourable energy 
efficiency ratings are consistent with the hedonic buy-to-let analysis of Fuerst et al. (2016) in 
Wales and particularly the significant premiums found for the overall housing market in 
England (Fuerst et al., 2015). However, a diverging result compared to the Wales study is our 
finding of a significant price discount for F and G rated buy-to-let properties. Consequently, 
the present paper’s results for England do not appear to support the conclusion of the previous 




same extent as owner occupiers due to the split incentive problem. While it would be necessary 
to directly compare a matched sample of owner-occupied versus buy-to-let dwellings in 
England for a full assessment of this question, the diverging findings for the bottom-rated EPC 
group may be due to inherent structural differences of the stock and/or time period considered 
in those studies. 
5.2. Implications for theory and practice on sustainability 
The importance of property energy reduction relies on the fact that buildings are resposnible 
for approximattely 40-50% of energy consumption globally as well as 33% of greenhouse gas 
emissions (Castleton et al., 2010; Berardi et al., 2014). Moreover, improving the housing stock 
is one of the major targets of the European Union, for example in its Energy Efficiency 
Directive 2012/27/EU (EED) (Femenías et al., 2018). Overall, the results provided by the 
present study reveal a statistically significant relationship between energy performance as 
captured by the EPC and market prices. Therefore, price premiums are reported for buildings 
with favourable energy efficiency levels and, conversely, price discounts are tied to less 
efficient energy properties. The importance of such results relies on the fact that it empirically 
supports the subject perception of economic value added by charging higher rental rates as a 
compensation of green property investments. 
The realisation of economic value-added as a return on green property investment through 
higher rental rates can a be a relevant incentive to increase such investments, which is highly 
desirable since public investment on building production made by European countries has been 
reduced and public funds are scarce. Therefore, the effective implementation of energy saving 
policies relies more on market forces – such as the ones explored in the present study – than 





A demonstrable link between achievable PRS rents and energy efficiency levels is crucial for 
landlords to have a monetary incentive for investing in energy efficiency. The results of the 
empirical analysis confirm that energy efficiency features exert a small but broadly significant 
influence on both transaction prices and quoted rental prices. A model of time-on-market 
against similar control variables yields inconclusive results but there is, albeit weak, evidence 
of a negative relationship between time-on-market and energy efficiency rating. 
Future research may aim to further unravel the causal relationship between energy efficiency 
and prices by analysing changes in observed or perceived energy efficiency features in the 
same dwelling units over time. Also, as the present analysis could not control for the general 
state of repair of a rental property, follow-up studies examining physical characteristics such 
as new kitchens, bathrooms or the general quality of the property are warranted.  
 
Overall, consistent with the extant literature on drivers of ‘green’ investments in the housing 
market, the results provide further empirical evidence on the relationship between energy 
efficiency ratings and pricing decisions in the PRS and demonstrate that the features captured 
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Descriptive statistics for key variables (n = 2,202). 
Continuous variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Price (P1) 127,860 258,666 
Price (P2) 172,662 358,311 
Compound annual growth rate (%) 4.47% 6.70% 





Germany Energy performance certificates have a limited 
effect on purchasing decisions 




Australia A, B or C rated properties command premiums of 





Netherlands Building with a green label sells at a premium of 
3.6 % 




Sweden Energy rating, on average, does not contribute to 
the market price premium of a house 




Taiwan Price premium exists for green features but 
premium for green label is not significant 






A small but positive relationship between energy 
performance and sale prices 
Deng et al., 
(2012) 
Standard hedonic 
model and fixed 
effect 
Singapore Substantial economic returns to green buildings in 
Singapore 




England 14% premium of the highest band of energy 
ratings 




Wales 18.5% and 4% for A/B rated and C rated buy-to-
let properties and no significant discount for 
lower-rated properties 




Ireland A-rated property receives a price premium of 






Sweden Home buyers consider the information in the 
EPCs, entailing a price premium 




Denmark Energy performance rating of properties play an 













Japan Green residential buildings trade at a price 
discount of 5.5% 




China Significant price premia for ‘green’ properties in 




Total floor area (m2) 80 35 
Energy efficiency rating   59 14 
Categorical variables Categories Frequency % of total 
Dwelling type Detached  221 10.04%  








Tenure Freehold 1,820 82.65%  
Leasehold 382 17.35% 
Vintage class Missing 275 12.49%  
Before 1900 326 14.80%  
1900–1929 491 22.30% 
 
1930–1949 187 8.49%  
1950–1966 152 6.90%  
1967–1975 115 5.22%  
1976–1982 100 4.54%  
1983–1990 155 7.04%  
1991–1995 112 5.09% 
 
1996–2002 158 7.18%  
2003–2006 111 5.04%  
2007 onwards 20 0.91% 
Number of bedrooms Missing 65 2.95%  
0 1 0.05%  
1 143 6.49% 
 
2 929 42.19%  
3 768 34.88%  
4 225 10.22%  
5 48 2.18%  
5 + 22 1.30% 
Energy efficiency band A 0 0.00% 
 
B 48 2.18%  
C 526 23.89%  
D 942 42.78%  
E 546 24.85%  












IMD decile where IMD-1 is the most deprived 10% of LSOA Missing  116 5.27% 
 
IMD-1 179 8.13%  
IMD-2 201 9.13%  
IMD-3 195 8.86%  
IMD-4 227 10.31%  
IMD-5 238 10.81%  




















Energy rating and sale price: hedonic estimations. 
Dependent variable: logarithm of sale price per m2. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Log EPC   0.119*** 
EPC band = D vs.: Reference Reference  
EPC band B/C 0.061*** 0.063***  
EPC band E 0.004 0.001  
EPC band F/G -0.101* -0.112**  
Property type = Detached vs.: Reference Reference Reference 
Semi-detached -0.181*** -0.197*** -0.188*** 
Terraced House -0.346*** -0.367*** -0.355*** 
Flat 0.007 -0.002 0.011 
Number of bedrooms 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
Log floor area in m2 -0.587*** -0.573*** -0.573*** 
Tenure freehold = yes 0.194*** 0.187*** 0.191*** 
Rural area = yes 0.000 0.014 0.015 
Purchased brand new -0.033 -0.038 -0.037 
Vintage class = Post 2002 vs.: Reference Reference Reference 
Missing -0.177*** -0.179*** -0.185*** 
Pre 1900 -0.174*** -0.167*** -0.184*** 
1900-1929 -0.305*** -0.302*** -0.315*** 
1930-1949 -0.312*** -0.313*** -0.319*** 
1950-1966 -0.445*** -0.444*** -0.452*** 
1967-1975 -0.308*** -0.321*** -0.334*** 
1976-1982 -0.262*** -0.261*** -0.271*** 
1983-1990 -0.307*** -0.305*** -0.312*** 
1991-1995 -0.201*** -0.207*** -0.218*** 
1996-2002 -0.113*** -0.117*** -0.118*** 
Log multiple IMD score Components 0.038*** 0.038*** 
Log employment score 0.039***   
Log education score 0.041***   
Log health score 0.024***   
Log income score 0.021**   
Log crime score 0.010   
Log barriers to housing score -0.005   
Log living environment score 0.012   




Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (model fit) 0.44 0.43 0.43 
Sample Size 4,132 4,132 4,132 
Asterisks indicate significance levels: *p = 0.05, **p = 0.01 and ***p = 0.001. Robust standard errors are used. 
 
 
Appendix D: Distribution charts of dwelling characteristics. 
 















































Fig. D.2.  Sample proportion of dwelling types. 
 

































































Descriptive statistics of the categorical data in the sample (n = 4,702). 
Variable  Categories  Frequency % of total 
Dwelling type Detached  216 4.59 
 
Flat 2,747 58.34 
 
Semi detached  576 12.23 
 
Terraced House 1,170 24.85 
Vintage class Missing  592 12.57 
 
Pre 1900 389 8.26 
 
1900-1929 592 12.57 
 
1930-1949 252 5.35 
 
1950-1966 277 5.88 
 
1967-1975 330 7.01 
 
1976-1982 210 4.46 
 
 1983-1990 444 9.43 
 
1991-1995 308 6.54 
 
1996-2002 538 11.42 
 
2003-2006 649 13.78 
 
Post 2006 128 2.72 
































1 723 15.6 
 
2 2,790 60.21 
 
3 833 17.98 
 
4 219 4.73 
 
5+ 69 1.46 
EPC rating A 1 0.02 
 
B 494 10.49 
 
C 1,666 35.38 
 
D 1,596 33.89 
 
E 739 15.69 
 
F 173 3.67 
 
G 40 0.85 
IMD decile where 1 is the most deprived 10% 1 271 6.35 
 
2 420 9.85 
 
3 382 8.96 
 
4 524 12.29 
 
5 491 11.51 
 
6 459 10.76 
 
7 443 10.39 
 
8 490 11.49 
 
9 402 9.43 
 
10 383 8.98 
Urban/ rural Urban 4,066 86.35 
 Rural 643 13.65 
Region North East 197 4.18 
 
North West 946 20.09 
 
Yorkshire  942 20 
 
East Midlands 522 11.09 
 
West Midlands 647 13.74 
 
East of England 301 6.39 
 
London 385 8.18 
 
South East 436 9.26 







Energy rating and rental price: hedonic estimations. 
Dependent variable: log of monthly rent per m2. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Log EPC   -0.159 
EPC band = D vs.: Reference Reference  
EPC band B 0.038* 0.026  
EPC band C 0.049*** 0.030***  




EPC band F/G -0.035 -0.049**  
Property type = Detached vs.: Reference Reference Reference 
Semi-detached -0.091*** -0.090*** -1.063** 
Terraced House -0.142*** -0.157*** -1.125*** 
Flat -0.065 -0.157*** -1.082** 
Interaction Terms (Property Type vs. Log EPC)    
Detached vs. Log EPC   Reference 
Semi-detached vs. Log EPC   0.237** 
Terraced House vs. Log EPC   0.239** 
Flat vs. Log EPC   0.247** 
Number of bedrooms 0.112*** 0.096*** 0.113*** 
Log floor area in m2 -0.705*** -0.745*** -0.703*** 
Tenure freehold = yes 0.023 0.016 0.014 
City or Urban area = yes 0.068*** 0.051*** 0.061*** 
Vintage class = Post 1995 vs.: Reference Reference Reference 
Missing 0.015 -0.007 0.008 
Pre 1900 -0.014 -0.053*** -0.023 
1900-1929 0.006 -0.118*** -0.002 
1930-1949 -0.046 -0.057*** -0.058** 
1950-1966 -0.048 -0.046** -0.051* 
1967-1975 -0.035 -0.062*** -0.053** 
1976-1982 -0.038 -0.045** -0.044* 
1983-1990 -0.028 -0.040** -0.032* 
1991-1995 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 
Log multiple IMD score Components 0.022*** 0.021*** 
Log employment score 0.024***   
Log education score 0.023***   
Log health score 0.011**   
Log income score 0.022***   
Log crime score -0.001   
Log barriers to housing score -0.009   
Log living environment score 0.020***   
Constant 4.115*** 4.828*** 5.247*** 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (model fit) 0.63 0.52 0.62 
Sample Size 4,076 4,076 4,076 






Energy rating and time-on-market: hedonic estimations. 
Dependent variable: log of time-on-market in days. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




EPC band = F/G vs.: Reference   
EPC band B -0.345*   
EPC band C -0.230   
EPC band D -0.065   
EPC band E -0.283*   
Property type = Detached vs.: Reference Reference Reference 
Semi-detached 0.212 0.168 -1.070 
Terraced House 0.251 0.209* -2.322 
Flat 0.209 0.189 -1.307 
Interaction Terms (Property Type vs. Log EPC)    
Detached vs. Log EPC   Reference 
Semi-detached vs. Log EPC   0.308 
Terraced House vs. Log EPC   0.626 
Flat vs. Log EPC   0.366 
Log Monthly Rent -0.173* -0.035 -0.185* 
Number of bedrooms 0.050 0.026 0.052 
Log floor area in m2 0.073 0.055 0.076 
Tenure freehold = yes -0.033 0.013 -0.024 
City or Urban area = yes -0.105 -0.146** -0.103 
Vintage class = Post 1995 vs.: Reference Reference Reference 
Missing 0.028 0.026 0.065 
Pre 1900 -0.171 -0.173* -0.094 
1900-1929 -0.200 -0.083 -0.154 
1930-1949 -0.283* -0.189* -0.227 
1950-1966 0.170 0.145 0.212 
1967-1975 -0.268* -0.046 -0.209 
1976-1982 -0.225 -0.088 -0.174 
1983-1990 0.029 0.041 0.083 
1991-1995 -0.109 0.014 -0.045 
Log multiple IMD score 0.062* 0.003 0.061* 
Constant 3.536*** 4.024*** 5.379** 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (model fit) 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Sample Size 4,069 4,069 4,069 
Asterisks indicate significance levels: *p = 0.05, **p = 0.01 and ***p = 0.001. Robust standard errors are used. 
 
 
 
